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Abstract 
 
The procurement of housing for remote Indigenous communities involves many 
factors that challenge the effectiveness of traditional building contracts. In addition to 
the logistical hurdles of remote construction, including the relatively high labour, 
transportation, and material costs, many government-sponsored remote building 
programs also incorporate a range of ‘non-housing’ outcomes. These might include; 
extensive community consultation and participation, targets for local Indigenous 
employment or training, or the inclusion of locally owned businesses in the 
construction process. Risk management of projects of this nature is complicated as 
many of the ‘non-housing’ outcomes are ambiguously defined, and can be difficult, in 
practice, to quantify. In project management terms, house building programs in 
remote Indigenous communities are characterised as ‘soft’ project types, and require 
appropriate management and contractual practices to be employed. 
 
This paper examines the approaches currently being employed in the Northern 
Territory and Western Australia as part of the National Partnership Agreement on 
Remote Indigenous Housing (NPARIH), and a separate, small scale building 
program conducted by Indigenous Business Australia (IBA) in the Northern Territory. 
The paper proposes a criteria guide for Indigenous procurement based on an 
analysis of the degree of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ dimensions of the project. Three 
contemporary case studies are examined, involving Alliancing (NT), Early Contractor 
Involvement (WA), and Design and Construct (NT-IBA) procurement methodologies. 
The effectiveness in achieving both ‘housing’ and ‘non-housing’ outcomes is 
discussed and potential areas of difficulties and opportunities identified. 
 
 
Key words: housing, Indigenous, procurement, risk management, ‘non-housing’ 
outcomes 
 
1. Introduction: 
In 2009, the Commonwealth and State and Territory Governments signed a ten year 
funding agreement for remote Indigenous housing provision. The agreement, which 
runs until mid-2018, allocates $5.5 billion of new and existing funding to build 4,200 
new houses and rebuild or refurbish another 4,800 dwellings in remote Indigenous 
communities nationwide. Under the terms of the agreement, the Commonwealth was 
primarily responsible for providing the funding, while the States and the Northern 
Territory undertook responsibility for the provision of the houses and refurbishments, 
and to provide a standardised tenancy management program consistent with 
Australia-wide public housing standards (FaHCSIA, 2009, COAG, 2009). In the 
Northern Territory, the National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous 
Housing (NPARIH) subsumed the 2008 Strategic Indigenous Housing and 
Infrastructure Program (SIHIP), a five year $672 million program to construct 750 
new houses and refurbish 2,500 existing dwellings in 73 remote communities by 
2013 (Northern Territory Government, 2009). Similarly in Western Australia, the 
NPARIH incorporated and extended existing housing programs in remote 
communities. A breakdown of the new funding levels and house targets is shown in 
Table 1. 
 State/Territory Total funding New houses targets 
Refurbished 
houses targets 
Northern 
Territory $1.7 billion 1456 2915 
Queensland $1.2 billion 1141 1216 
Western 
Australia $1.2 billion 1012 1288 
South Australia $291.5 million 241 206 
New South 
Wales $396.8 million 310 101 
Tasmania $28.0 million 18 51 
Victoria $30.4 million – – 
Commonwealth 
own Purpose 
Expenditure 
$698.5 million – – 
Total $5.5 billion 4178 5777 
Table 1: NPARIH funding and targets, 2008-2018 (ANAO, 2011:40) 
 
This paper examines the circumstances of building in remote areas and proposes a 
criteria guide for assessing potential projects to assist in selecting appropriate 
procurement methods. It uses three case studies to illustrate the criteria guide in 
current practice. In section 2, a quick comparison of different procurement 
methodologies is outlined, while section 3 looks specifically at the issues affecting 
procurement of housing in remote Indigenous communities, and sets out the criteria 
guide. Section 4 introduces the case studies, and the findings in relation to the 
criteria guide are discussed in section 5.  
 
2. Procurement and risk: 
Different procurement options vary in the degree of separation or integration between 
the design, management, and construction phases of a project. This variation reflects 
the different allocation of risk among the client, design, management and 
construction parties that are involved. The greater the separation of the different 
parties, the more unambiguously risk may be allocated to specific parties. However, it 
is not necessarily the case that clearly defined and separated risk allocation is in the 
best interest of project success. Five common procurement types are introduced 
here. 
 
Traditional Contracting (Conventional or General Contracting), involves a clear 
separation of the design and construction processes. Consultants (including 
architects, engineers, quantity surveyors, and so on), typically complete a design 
which is subsequently tendered out to a building contractor. Commonly, payment is 
based on work completed. This method generally allows for a competitive tendering 
process and a high degree of cost certainty at the start of construction (Rowlinson 
and McDermott, 1999). However, due to the separation of the design and construct 
phases, project time is often longer (compared to other options), and integration 
between different (separate) actors must be carefully managed. The client carries the 
design and documentation risk (and hence responsibility for variations or changes 
requested after tender), while the contractor assumes the cost risk of the project, 
which includes the contractors profit margin (Connell Wagner, 2007a). 
 
In Management Contracting (Design and Manage), a management organisation 
works with the designers and consultants to produce a completed design, which is 
then tendered out in packages or stages to building contractors, while the 
management organisation continues to manage and coordinate the project. In this 
type of arrangement, the client is likely to have a greater involvement with the project 
than in other procurement options (Masterman, 2002). Project times are able to be 
shortened as the process employs a coordinated contracting arrangement, and value 
management is emphasised. Good value for money is possible as each of the work 
packages is competitively tendered, however, there is no set cost at the start of 
construction and more risk is taken on by the client (Connell Wagner, 2007a; 
Rowlinson and McDermott, 1999). Generally, the Managing Contractor faces little 
financial risk for the performances of others as the contracts are set on a cost-
reimbursable basis (including a fee for managing the project). This can lead to 
complicated contractual arrangements and assignments of liability. 
 
Construction Management is a third type of procurement, where project organisation 
oversight is via a management system provided by a construction manager or project 
manager. The design and construction phases of the project are undertaken by 
separate organisations with input from the client and project team into construction 
strategy and contractor selection. Designed to minimise conflict between design 
teams and those responsible for supervising construction (Swainton, 2008), 
contractual incentives can encourage quick delivery, and with large projects, costs 
can be controlled by competitive tendering of separate work packages. However, 
construction manager costs may be significant due to their extensive involvement 
and the complex services and reporting they are expected to provide. Consultant 
fees may also be higher due to the increased requirements for documentation and 
reporting. There is also a risk of cost changes due to the sequential issue of 
documents for each work package. The fixed lump sum cost of a project is not known 
until the final work package has been let, but the construction manager does not bear 
the risk of cost increases, which lie with the client (Connell Wagner, 2007a).  
 
A forth approach is known as Integrated Contracting (which includes; Design and 
Construct, Turnkey Approach, Novated Design and Construct, and Design, Build, 
Finance and Operate (DBFO). Integrated contracting includes procurement variants 
where there is a single point of contact for the client. This contractor oversees the 
design and construction phases of the project (and the operation in the case of 
DBFO’s). In the case of a Design and Construct contract, the contractor (which may 
be a consortium), is appointed via a tendering process for a fixed price plus provision 
for unknown works. Sub-contract works are then let using a closed book 
arrangement by the contractor (Masterman, 2002). This type of procurement method 
allows for shorter project times as design and construction are integrated, the 
designs have a high level of buildability, and client involvement can be minimal. Apart 
from variations, the contractor assumes the risk for the design and construction of the 
project, and as these can be difficult to anticipate, a risk premium can be built into the 
tender bid. If the risk is under-valuated, this can lead to lower quality work by the 
contractor (who is working on a fixed sum), and this in turn can lead to an adversarial 
relationship between the contractor and client regarding cost and quality (Connell 
Wagner, 2007a). 
 
In Collaborative Contracting situations (including Partnering, Alliancing, Early 
Contractor Involvement), it is the client who establishes the framework for the overall 
administration of the project. The client and the contractor (which may be a 
consortium), then effectively act as one entity. This should ensure that the client and 
the contractor have aligned drivers and goals and share responsibility for achieving 
key performance indicators. There is scope for the project team to be rewarded for 
innovation, and projects will often include incentives for meeting targets (and 
penalties for missing targets) that are shared across all parties, known as ‘pain 
share-gain share’ (White, 2003; Wright, 2008). Risk is shared and is pro-actively 
identified and managed as early as possible (Eddie, 2007). This entails relatively high 
levels of trust between the client and contractors and can be effective for projects 
with high levels of uncertainty (QLD CPO, 2008). 
 
3. Remote Indigenous housing procurement: 
As the description of general construction procurement options above indicates, 
choice of a procurement model is essentially about the appointment of risks, costs 
and returns. Building in remote communities is risky. From the logistical standpoint, 
the remoteness of the building site means that costs are increased for labour, 
materials and transport. Very often accommodation for a workforce is unavailable on 
site, and so this requires workers’ camps to be established before housing 
construction can start. Indigenous communities must be engaged and land accessed, 
for example, via the negotiation of leases. Weather events, either annual or 
exceptional, can result in communities being cut off from road access for periods of 
months. In the case of housing need assessment, there is often uncertainty over the 
condition of existing houses, and hence uncertainty over the potential scope of a 
project. Local climate conditions (such as sand and dust, hot temperatures, high 
humidity, and the presence of salt water), and a high intensity of use for everyday 
household components (such as taps, door handles, and so on) due to high 
occupancy numbers in households, can place significant demands upon remote 
Indigenous house designs and finishes. This is compounded by the difficulty of 
providing timely repair and maintenance in remote locations which means that even 
relatively simply repaired faults may remain unattended causing further damage. It 
cannot be assumed that residents in remote communities have easy access to the 
replacement parts, tools or advice needed to complete small, running upkeep of 
house hardware. As a result, specifications for household components need to be 
especially robust. 
 
There are also risk factors associated with social outcomes that are typically attached 
to house building programs in remote communities. These stem from the recognition 
that construction programs, particularly ones where up to one hundred new dwellings 
might be built, often represent significant economic and capacity building 
opportunities for communities with small population sizes and limited economic 
activity. For a project to achieve a broad measure of success, this generally includes 
extensive community consultation processes, prior to and during construction, and 
contribution to regional economic development by using local resources and 
businesses (Davidson 2011, Fien 2008). The NPARIH includes provisions for a 
minimum level of employment for local community members on work sites, along with 
the expectation that training and apprenticeship positions would be made available 
and facilitated during the construction phase in a community (FaHCSIA, 2009a). 
These expectations are part of the overall risk profile of a project as they are required 
to be met, and there are consequences for not meeting them. However, such ‘non-
housing’ outcomes are often difficult to quantify and/or are quantified using metrics 
unfamiliar in the construction industry. 
 
The risks and expectations of social outcomes, in addition to having construction 
outcomes, indicate the difficulty in choosing appropriate procurement methods in 
diverse remote Indigenous communities. ‘Hard’ and ‘soft’ have been used to indicate 
the degree of certainty in measuring the goals of a particular project. As Crawford 
and Pollack have pointed out, the use of the terms ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ outcomes in such 
situations is widespread; however they are often used in ambiguous ways (Crawford 
and Pollack, 2004:645). Traditional project management tends towards hard 
(objectivist, technocratic) rather than soft (subjectivist, critical) approaches, as the 
discipline was influenced by Systems Engineering and Systems Analysis, which 
utilise predominantly hard methodologies. In their analysis of the relationship 
between hard and soft project elements and project success, Crawford and Pollack 
established a framework around seven ‘influential aspects of projects’, these are set 
out in Table 2 below (Crawford and Pollack, 2004:646). In order to assess a 
particular project, the framework reduces each of the seven dimensions to 
dichotomies and sets them on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 representing ultimate 
hardness and 100, ultimate softness (see Fig. 1). In this configuration, soft results 
imply a broad analysis whereas hard results imply a targeted focus (Crawford and 
Pollack, 2004:649). Projects may then be analysed for their hard or soft aspects 
across the seven dimensions in order to establish links between known project 
successes or failures, and a project’s characteristics. The framework can also be 
used to predict which procurement type might be more effective in ensuring project 
success based on the projects hard and soft profile.  
 
Dimensions Description 
Goal/objective clarity How clearly defined the project goals and objectives are 
Goal/objective 
tangibility How tangible the project goals and objectives are 
Success measures The kinds of measures used to judge project success 
Project permeability How subject the project is to risk outside of project control 
Number of solution 
options 
The project approach to exploring and refining the 
goals 
Degree of 
participation and 
practitioner role 
The roles that team members take in managing the 
project 
Stakeholder 
expectations 
What influential stakeholders consider to be a valid 
application of project management 
Table 2: Project dimensions and definitions (Crawford and Pollack, 2004) 
 
As noted by Crawford and Pollack, analysing hard and soft aspects of projects ‘leads 
to enhanced recognition of their complexity and legitimises questioning the standard 
application of the more readily accepted hard approaches to project management’ 
(Crawford and Pollack, 2004:651). Drawing on the work of Crawford and Pollack, and 
tailoring it to the particularities of remote Indigenous housing provision, a criteria 
guide is proposed to help inform a critical assessment of particular projects and the 
procurement methods employed. The guide has seven criteria that are set out in 
Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Depiction of the hard and soft dimensions framework (Crawford and Pollack, 2004) 
 
Criteria Description 
Risk Apportionment of risk and responsibilities 
Clarity and Tangibility Flexibility or ease of variation in dealing with uncertainty 
Time Importance of timing and timelines 
Cost Ensuring lowest cost outcome and enabling cost certainty 
Non-housing 
outcomes 
Ability to incorporate ‘non-building’ or ‘non-housing’ 
outcomes 
Process Ensuring community participation and managing expectations 
Design/Built Form Design and building integration, buildability, and quality 
Table 3: Criteria guide for Indigenous housing procurement 
 
These criteria form the basis for assessing recent house building projects in remote 
Indigenous communities in the Northern Territory and Western Australia. 
 
Goals/objectives 
clearly defined 
Goals/objectives highly 
ambiguously defined 
Physical artefact Abstract concept 
Only quantitative 
measures 
Only qualitative 
measures 
Not subject to 
external influences 
Highly subject to 
external influences 
Refinement of single 
solution 
Exploration of many 
alternative solutions 
Expert practitioner, 
no stakeholder 
participation 
Facilitative practitioner, 
high stakeholder 
involvement 
Values technical 
performance and 
efficiency, manages by 
monitoring and control 
Values relationships, 
culture and meaning, 
manages by negotiation 
and discussion 
0 100 
0 100 
0 100 
0 100 
0 100 
0 100 
0 100 
2. Goal tangibility 
3. Success measures 
4. Project Permeability 
5. Number of solution options 
6. Participation and practitioner role 
7. Stakeholder expectations 
1. Goal clarity 
 4. Case study results: 
Three case studies are presented. Two are large scale building programs that are 
part of the NPARIH agreements in the Northern Territory and Western Australia, 
while the third is a smaller, targeted building program conducted by the 
Commonwealth Government agency, Indigenous Business Australia, in the Northern 
Territory. 
 
Case study 1: Alliancing, NT 
The Commonwealth and Northern Territory Governments jointly established SIHIP in 
2007 (it was announced in April 2008) to deliver a significant construction and 
upgrade program to housing stock throughout the remote communities in the 
Northern Territory. The Program listed 16 communities in which major works would 
be undertaken and 57 other communities that would receive refurbishment work. In 
total, SIHIP was committed to provide 750 new houses, 230 rebuilds and 2,500 
refurbishments to houses in the NT by the end of 2013 (FaHCSIA, 2009a). The 
Alliance methodology was selected by an in-house strategic working group in 
response to the Program Objectives (Connell Wagner, 2009b). The housing program 
was one of three concurrent changes to the provision of housing in remote 
communities in the Northern Territory. The other two were land tenure reform and the 
shift of community housing management from local organisations to a public housing 
system, established under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the 
Australian and Territory Governments in 2007 (FaHCSIA, 2009a).  
 
The Alliance partners were appointed during a period when the scope of works for 
each targeted community remained uncertain, although some absolute targets had 
been publicly reported.  Hence, against a background of urgency, specific projects 
and the methods for achieving them were not always well defined. Nevertheless, 
seven Program Objectives are outlined in Table 4. 
 
Criteria Description 
Housing Outcomes 
Housing that meets resident's needs and effectively 
reduces overcrowding in selected communities 
Quality 
New and existing houses constructed and refurbished 
to an appropriate standard 
Criteria Description 
Social and Economic 
Outcomes 
Employment supported by training of Indigenous 
people to achieve a sustainable workforce to each 
community for the ongoing construction, maintenance 
and management of housing 
Time Completion by June 2013 
Cost 
Whole of life cost of delivering and managing houses 
is reduced, through innovation and economies of 
scale 
Management Best 
Practices 
Achieve a step change improvement in the delivery of 
major housing programs and use this as a basis for 
the delivery of a range of future housing programs and 
schemes 
Relationships 
Achieve positive relationships with openness and 
transparency, and an understanding of local needs.  
Establish an environment that enables better 
outcomes for infrastructure employment, and 
workforce development 
Table 4: SIHIP Program objectives (Connell Wagner 2007b) 
 
In an attempt to meet these objectives the SIHIP working group recommended that: 
 
1. An Alliancing Partnering contracting methodology be adopted for the 
Program 
2. A Panel with a minimum of three ‘one-stop-shop’ Alliance Partners be 
created 
3. Each Alliance Partner be awarded a single works package in the first year of 
the Program 
4. Costs and performance be monitored regularly 
5. Further community work packages be awarded in subsequent years based 
on performance 
6. The Alliance Partner be retained in the community to perform refurbishment 
and transition to maintenance work and to complete training objectives 
7. New housing and associated infrastructure be undertaken in each 
community as quickly as possible and 
8. Individual programs be adjusted in accordance with the amount and type of 
work required in each community (Connell Wagner 2007b). 
 
In SIHIP stage 1, the panel based approach was favoured over a single entity being 
responsible for all of the work as it was felt that this would allow risk to be spread. 
Also, different panel ‘teams’ could be more effectively tailored to individual 
communities and that key performance indicator (KPI) comparison across multiple 
teams would facilitate more reliable performance monitoring. The possibility of future 
work packages (on a semi-competitive basis) was also viewed as likely to increase 
the incentives to meet performance targets (Connell Wagner 2007b, FaHCSIA 
2007a). The approach of SIHIP, therefore, was to establish a panel of three “one-
stop-shop” housing services providers capable of providing: 
• New build housing 
• Housing refurbishments 
• Housing infrastructure works (civil works) 
• Housing maintenance and Facility Management services 
• Training and employment of community workforce 
 
In 2009, a review of the SIHIP program led to concerns over the cost and 
effectiveness of the governance structure in place, and recommended a modified 
reporting and approval process (FaHCSIA, 2009a). The major organisational 
changes were the introduction of greater Commonwealth Government oversight and 
participation and the move to have program management performed by government 
employees rather than external consultants. The effect of the changes in 
organisational structure recommended in the post-2009 review altered the 
distribution of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ objectives and goals associated with the SIHIP project. 
After the review, there was an increased emphasis on the cost-per-dwelling over the 
project and achieving the stated number of new and refurbished dwellings on time. 
This corresponded with a diminishing emphasis on targets concerning community 
participation and a pull back of the scope of building work, for example yard works 
and verandahs. This represented a noticeable ‘hardening’ of the measure of program 
success. 
 
Case study 2: Early Constructor Involvement, WA 
The WA Department of Housing (formally Department of Housing and Works), 
through its Aboriginal Housing division, decided on a housing procurement method 
utilising Early Contractor Involvement (or Early Builder Involvement, ECI or EBI) in 
order to fulfil their obligations to the Commonwealth associated with the signing of 
the National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing (NPARIH) in 
2009. As detailed below, this involved dividing work areas in WA into 5 regions and 
assigning each region with a preferred ‘panel’ builder. Four of the areas were within 
the Kimberley region: Fitzroy Crossing, Halls Creek, with two communities on the 
Dampier Peninsula.  
 
The agreement signed in December 2009 stipulated the building of 75 new houses 
and the completion 150 refurbishments by June 2010. Sixty of the 75 new houses 
were to be built in the Kimberly region (in Ardyaloon, Beagle Bay, Pandanus Park, 
Kalumburra, Kupingarri, Darlganga, Kurnanki, Parapukan, Mardiwah Loop, Nicholson 
Block, Warman and Wirrimanu), while most of the 150 refurbishments were also be 
in 13 Kimberley communities. Given the logistical difficulties of building in the 
Kimberley region, this very tight timeframe had consequences for both procurement 
method choice and building type (discussed below). The NPARIH stipulated that if 
any jurisdiction (State or Territory) failed to meet targets, then other States or 
Territories were able to mount arguments to request larger portions of the overall 
allocation in subsequent funding rounds at the expense of the ‘jurisdiction’ that failed 
to meet spending/construction targets. 
 
The majority of initial work to be undertaken by the panel builders was in the form of 
refurbishments (around 150), with the 75 new houses to be delivered using a 
separate procurement strategy (using factory-built transportables). However, it is 
envisaged that over the 10 year life of the NPARIH, most building work either new 
buildings or refurbishments, will be contracted via an ECI method. This represents a 
form of ‘relational contracting’ with the Department further breaking the works 
program down into a ‘small works program’ and a ‘large works program’ where; 
 
• Small Works (less than $2 million) – Early Builder Involvement method 
• Large Works (over $2 million and up $5 million) – initially labelled as an 
Alliance method (later also called EBI) 
The switch to ECI/EBI arrangements from the previous practice of using more 
traditional procurement options was facilitated by the longer funding timeframe (5 
year blocks) available under the NPARIH. The Department had been concerned that 
previous one year funding cycles had led to the funding becoming ‘out-of-step’ with 
construction timelines (when using traditional tender based procurement). This had 
led to a lack of long term planning, and caused disruption in the communities with 
contractors coming and going based on funding availability not completed work 
schedules. There was also an appreciation on behalf of the Department that tender 
processes that favoured the lowest bidder did not always provide satisfactory 
outcomes in the inherently difficult and risky work of providing houses in remote 
Indigenous areas. ECI/EBI allowed greater flexibility in planning and experience to be 
built-up, both in construction terms and community engagement, as contractors could 
be inserted into communities for longer periods of time. The ECI/EBI approach also 
ensures that government Project Managers and the builder/contractor visit sites 
together to jointly scope work and consult stakeholders (WA Department of Housing, 
2009).  
 
Case study 3: Design and Construct, NT 
In contrast with the two case studies above, in this case, four dwellings were 
constructed at a cost of around $1 million, as part of a the IBA ‘Home Ownership on 
Indigenous Land’ (HOIL) building program intended to stimulate demand for home 
ownership.  A Design & Construct methodology for delivering the new houses in 
Nguiu was chosen. The particular tender process entered into however was the 
result of significant pre-construction research and development that informed the 
design and construction specifications (Burroughs, 2010). 
 
The HOIL program was designed to allow Indigenous people living on Aboriginal 
community land access to similar loans for the purchase of existing community- or 
public-housing dwellings, or the purchase of new houses on community land (IBA, 
2010). Take-up of the program was initially slow, prompting IBA to undertake to build 
four new houses for sale (essentially display homes) on Nguiu, in order to raise the 
profile and local understanding of the HOIL program. Nguiu was chosen as it was the 
first community in the Northern Territory to sign a 99-year lease with the 
Commonwealth Government paving the way for private ownership (of housing) to 
proceed. In all, one four-bedroom house and three two-bedroom houses were 
constructed and sold to local residents.  
 
There are several distinct elements to the procurement that differentiate it from a 
standard D&C arrangement. IBA remained the Project Manager on the project. While 
IBA used a public tender process requesting suitably experienced contractors to 
respond to set design and materials specifications, the tender specifications outlined 
materials and contraction methods for a pre-prepared housing design solutions. The 
specifications aimed to deliver a product that was innovative, affordable and culturally 
sensitive and which included: 
 
• designs developed by IBA’s Design and Development Team consisting of 
sleeping modules and open living deck areas 
• house designs providing for 2-4 bedroom options, large secure open living 
spaces, separate wet areas and a kitchen facility located in the open living 
area 
• that houses are to be constructed from low maintenance and durable 
materials and furnishings that are appropriate for the climatic conditions 
and high use 
• technical specifications that require full compliance with the Building Code 
of Australia (which is not always mandatory in remote communities) 
 
The first dot point above marked a significant departure from the normal tendering 
process for domestic housing. Instead of being asked to tender on a complete 
dwelling, prospective building companies were asked to tender costs for a series of 
housing modules. Each was to be costed separately. The rationale behind this 
approach came from a requirement for community engagement in the form and 
design of the dwellings. With individual modules to choose from, local community 
members (who would later own the house) could piece together a design of their 
choice to accommodate their particular family/residential circumstances. This was a 
hybrid method, as residents could not ‘design their house from the ground up’, but 
could ‘compose it from identically sized and costed alternative pieces’ (Burroughs, 
2010). 
 
Another point of difference with Case Studies 1 and 2 was the choice of primary 
material for the houses. The primary structure, walls and floor were constructed of 
plywood. Timber construction was also used in the kitchen and wet areas. This was 
chosen on the basis of cost (10 alternative walling systems were investigated for 
example, but were deemed too expensive), and the fact that the houses could be 
completely fabricated on site, a situation that maximised the potential local workforce 
participation. To allay fears of termite infestation or problems with children and 
‘chemically treated timber’, a Wood Product Association specialist took part in the 
community consultation process. The construction project had an OHS and 
Environmental management plan (Burroughs, 2010). 
 
5. Findings and discussion: 
In all three case studies, but particularly in the two larger programs, risk is spread as 
broadly as possible over the clients (the NT and WA Governments) and the 
contractors. This is recognition of the high level of underlying risk involved with 
remote construction in Indigenous communities. In response, the State and Territory 
Governments have chosen procurement methods that involve early, collaborative 
relationship building between the contractor and client. 
 
In Case Studies 1 and 2, the combination of uncertainty over the amount of work 
required refurbishing existing stock, and the presence in the contracts of difficult to 
quantify non-housing performance indicators tied to payment levels, resulted in a 
high degree of underlying uncertainty over the goals of the projects, despite the 
seemingly unambiguous number new and refurbished houses designated by the 
Commonwealth Government. That is, the clarity and tangibility of project goals, and 
its measures of success were biased to the soft side. The ECI method used in Case 
Study 2 is well suited to a situation in which uncertainty as to the scope of work is the 
norm, as it allows both the client and contractor to jointly assess existing conditions 
and reduces the need to build in risk contingencies on the part of the contractor, or to 
press for changes in scope after the signing of contracts. Case Study 3 had the 
highest level of (hard) project clarity and tangibility, as its goals were targeted and 
specific. Yet even in this small project, a concern for non-housing outcomes such as 
extensive community consultation and potential on-site training opportunities, 
necessary for a successful acceptance of the project by the community, influenced 
the distinct form of procurement method used (a softened for of a ‘design and 
construct’ methodology). 
 
In Case Study 2, the ECI method enables the WA Government, through their project 
managers, to observe the contractors interaction with local stakeholders, an 
important consideration when working in Indigenous communities, with the additional 
benefit of reducing the time from project conception to work commencing (a soft 
approach to the project’s participation and stakeholder expectation dimensions). The 
longer time frame of the relationship between the Government client and the 
contractor (5 years under the initial NPARIH), also allows for better construction 
management of the wet season/dry season impediment to building than the previous 
one year contracts set by the financial year. However, the system does not facilitate 
extremely short time frames for building. The Commonwealth Government’s short 
time frame given to the WA Government for the first tranche of houses (75 new 
houses and 150 refurbishments in 6 months), at the beginning of the NPARIH, 
resulted in the narrowing of procurement options to purchasing prefabricated 
transportable houses manufactured off-site in Perth, Darwin and Alice Springs. This 
in turn had repercussions for several of the non-housing outcomes, noticeably job 
participation by community members. This reflects the high permeability (in Crawford 
and Pollack’s terms), of the NPARIH projects where outside influences such a policy 
changes or political imperatives can necessitate trade-offs being made between one 
element of a project and another. Most commonly, this involves the ‘hardening’ of 
goals that began as ‘soft’ at the beginning of a project (the non-housing outcomes), 
and project success becoming ‘more readily measured’. 
  
Ensuring lowest cost outcomes and enabling cost certainty is a central concern of all 
construction procurement decisions. However, in all three of the case studies, there 
was an understanding that the lowest cost outcome (in terms of initial tender), does 
not guarantee the best overall outcome. In Case Study 3, cost was of a particular 
issue as the original intention was to recover construction costs from the sale of the 
completed houses. This had to be balanced by the ability of the limited potential 
market for those houses to service mortgages. There was a commitment across all 
three case studies to build in durability (at a higher initial cost), as a way of managing 
future repairs and maintenance costs. In Case Studies 1 and 2, the background for 
that decision is the ongoing ownership and responsibility for the dwellings by the 
client (as they as public housing stock). Notwithstanding this, in both cases pressure 
from the Commonwealth Government to ensure cost control was high. An example of 
a ‘harder’ approach by the Commonwealth Government than their State and Territory 
counter-parts, perhaps reflecting the different levels of responsibility for the dwellings 
after project completion. In Case Study 3, with IBA wanting to demonstrate the 
benefits of home ownership, consideration of future repairs and maintenance was an 
important aspect of ‘after sales’ service, as these responsibilities were being 
assumed by home-owners (often for the first time). A particular emphasis was placed 
on the building experience in remote communities by the contractors. This 
experience was considered of greater importance than bottom line costs. 
 
All of the case studies included non-housing outcomes as part of the construction 
program, such as consultation processes and minimum requirements for local 
Indigenous training, which were considered valuable despite putting upward pressure 
on the bottom line costs. The recommendation of the advisory panel in Case Study 1 
to proceed with an Alliance methodology over a Managing Contractor one was 
related primarily to considerations of non-housing outcomes. Alliancing was expected 
to be better able to enable the participation of smaller building companies in the NT, 
and ensure the participation targets for Indigenous workers and trainees were met. In 
Case Study 2, prefabrication of the initial new houses provided under the NPARIH, 
impacted negatively on the Indigenous workforce targets as the bulk of construction 
work was carried out outside of local communities (although the in-situ refurbishment 
program was more successful). However, problems in engaging Indigenous firms 
were also encountered, for example, it was noted that many small Indigenous 
businesses found it too costly to meet the Federal Safety Commission requirements 
needed to bid for jobs over $3 million.  
 
The choice of an Alliance methodology in Case Study 1 allowed for the contractor to 
be involved in the project earlier than if a Managing Contractor system had been 
employed, reflecting the project softer bias towards stakeholder participation and 
expectations. It was also expected to facilitate local employment through smaller 
building companies in the NT, as noted in the non-housing outcomes above. The 
early use of cooperative action is a means to reduce risk caused by uncertainty, 
although this process may also redistribute unforeseen problems that are ultimately 
directed back to the government client to resolve. Case Study 2’s methodology 
followed the same logic as that of Case Study 1. In Case Study 3, the small scale of 
the building project allowed for an extensive consultation process to take place, this 
was important in convincing community members to then purchase the houses 
produced, an unusual situation in remote Indigenous communities and one requiring 
considerable commitment on the part of the purchaser. So similar to Case Studies 1 
and 2, stakeholder participation and expectations were still on the soft side, despite 
this project having harder goal clarity and tangibility than the other two. The 
consultation process then had a direct influence over the form of the tender process. 
 
The quality of design and finished product was high across the three case studies. In 
Case Study 2, the use of prefabricated houses manufactured in factory conditions 
enabled a high level of buildability, design and building integration, and quality 
control, although at the cost of local Indigenous employment. Governance and 
oversight of quality is also able to be maintained easier in urban factories than 
remote communities. In Case Study 1, while an economy of scale was achieved by 
using similar designs in multiple communities, the Alliances were able to adapt the 
building material used where local situations made it favourable. For example, an off-
the-shelf concrete walling system was used in several communities, but not in 
Wadeye, where the local concrete panel factory was used to make the wall panels. 
Case Study 3’s modular tendering process allowed for some personalisation of the 
house designs by prospective buyers, and the designs included several features that 
emerged directly from the consultation process, such as the inclusion of bathtubs, 
and ventilated internal corridors, that effectively doubled as secure verandah space 
for extra sleeping area. That many of these project’s dimensions were considered 
soft in Crawford and Pollack’s terms did not mean that high standards of design, 
construction and quality control could not be achieved. 
 
6. Conclusion: 
There is considerable complexity in managing risk in Indigenous housing 
procurement in an era of significant activity expected to provide both technical and 
social outcomes. The case studies have highlighted a collaborative approach to 
assessing risk between the government clients and contractors, and that multi-year 
partnerships provide a mechanism and incentive for the non-housing elements to be 
effective. In exploring the ‘hard-soft’ continuum, it is clear that managing risk implies 
measuring risk, and that soft outcomes (and risks) are more difficult to measure than 
hard outcomes (and risks). Regardless, hard to quantify outcomes are important, 
particularly if community capacity building and leaving a skills ‘legacy’ are to be key 
elements of future construction projects.  
 
Not all remote Indigenous building programs will have a focus on soft components, 
but where these are present, the use of a criteria guide that requires at the onset a 
consideration of definition of project success in terms of construction and non-
construction outcomes, along the lines of the one proposed in this paper, will be 
useful in determining a preferred procurement method. Not least because it 
necessitates a consideration of community needs and risks, not solely risk mitigation 
for the contractor. Procurement methods are not an end in themselves, but should be 
viewed as a pathway to achieving goals. As the case studies in this paper indicate, 
an Alliancing or partnering procurement model, in conjunction with a longer term 
funding model, has shown the potential to incorporate aims outside of typical 
‘housing’outcomes (the numbers of dwellings, cost and time), and achieve real 
progress in several non-housing areas, such as consultation, capacity building and 
training, while still producing large numbers of good quality dwellings.  
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